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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Moulin (1999) caractérise les méthodes de rationnement suivant un sentier fixe par 
l’efficacité, la non-manipulation, l’homogénéité et la monotonicité de ressources. Nous 
donnons ici une preuve simple de son résultat. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-
proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward 
proof of his result. 
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating a commodity among a group of agents with
single-peaked preferences. For example, the commodity is a project requiring a cer-
tain number of hours of labor. One hour of labor is either innitely divisible (the
continuous model) or indivisible (the discrete model).
Sprumont (1991) is the paper that originated a number of axiomatic studies in
the continuous model over the past ten years. Recently, Moulin (1999) introduces
a new class of rules, called xed-path rationing methods, and characterizes them by
eciency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity.
1
His theorem
applies to both the continuous and the discrete model. The purpose of this note is to
give a straightforward proof of his result.
2 The Model and the Result
Our formulation allows variations in the population and in the collective endowment.
There is a nite set N = f1; : : : ; n
0
g of potential agents.
2
Let Z denote the set of all
(possible) endowments. The set Z is either R
+
or N [ f0g. When Z = R
+
, we speak
of the continuous model, and when Z = N [ f0g, we speak of the discrete model.
For each agent i 2 N there is an a priori xed maximal consumption, denoted by
X
i
2 Znf0g. Given X
i
2 Znf0g, agent i's consumption set is [0; X
i
] \ Z. From now
on, given b 2 Z, we write [0; b] instead of [0; b] \ Z. Thus, [0; X
i
] denotes agent i's
consumption set. The vector (X
i
)
i2N
of maximal consumption is xed throughout.
Given N  N , let X
N

P
i2N
X
i
. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a preference
relation R
i
over [0; X
i
]. Let P
i
denote the strict preference relation associated with R
i
.
The preference relation R
i
is single-peaked if there is a number p(R
i
) 2 [0; X
i
], called
the peak of R
i
, such that for all x
i
; y
i
2 [0; X
i
], if y
i
< x
i
 p(R
i
) or p(R
i
)  x
i
< y
i
,
then x
i
P
i
y
i
. Let R
i
denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over [0; X
i
].
A collective endowment of a commodity has to be allocated among a nite set of
agents. We allow the set of agents to be any (nite) subset N  N . Let 
 2 Z denote
1
In the continuous model, the rst studies of consistency and resource-monotonicity, respectively,
are Thomson (1994a,b).
2
All results remain valid when N is a countable, innite set.
1
the endowment. Given N  N , a (preference) prole R is a list (R
i
)
i2N
such that
for all i 2 N , R
i
2 R
i
. Let R
N
denote the set of all proles for N . Given R 2 R
N
,
let p(R)  (p(R
i
))
i2N
. Given S  N  N and R 2 R
N
, let R
S
 (R
i
)
i2S
denote the
restriction of R to S. Given N  N , an economy is a pair (R;
) 2 R
N
 [0; X
N
]. Let
E
N
 R
N
[0; X
N
]. The economy (R;
) 2 E
N
is in excess demand if 
 
P
i2N
p(R
i
),
and it is in excess supply if 
 >
P
i2N
p(R
i
).
For all N  N , an allocation for (R;
) 2 E
N
is a vector z 2 Z
N
such that for
all i 2 N , z
i
2 [0; X
i
], and
P
i2N
z
i
= 
, i.e., we do not allow free disposal. Let
Z(R;
) denote the set of all allocations for (R;
). An allocation rule, or simply a
rule, associates with each economy an allocation. Formally, a rule ' is a mapping
' : [
NN
E
N
! [
NN
Z
N
, such that for all N  N and all (R;
) 2 E
N
, '(R;
) 2
Z(R;
).
A xed-path rationing method (Moulin, 1999) relies on two xed monotonic paths
in the box 
i2N
[0; X
i
]. For economies in excess demand, individual consumptions are
computed along the rst path, except that an agent whose demand is below his path-
consumption receives exactly his demand. We apply a similar procedure for economies
in excess supply by using the other path. We refer to Moulin (1999) for additional
discussion.
Formally, given N  N , an N-path is a mapping g(N) : [0; X
N
]! Z
N
such that
3
(a) for all  2 [0; X
N
],
P
i2N
g
i
(N; ) = , and for all i 2 N , g
i
(N; )  X
i
; and
(b) for all ;
~
 2 [0; X
N
] such that  
~
, for all i 2 N , g
i
(N; )  g
i
(N;
~
).
In the above denition, (a) is feasibility of an N -path and (b) is monotonicity of an
N -path. For an N -path g(N), let (g(N)) denote the range of g(N), i.e., (g(N)) 
fg(N; ) j 2 [0; X
N
]g.
A full path g species for each set N  N an N -path g(N) (i.e. g  (g(N))
NN
)
such that
4
(c) for all N 
~
N  N , proj
N
[(g(
~
N))] = (g(N)).
Condition (c) says that the projection of the range of the
~
N -path g(
~
N) on Z
N
is the
range of the N -path g(N). Let G denote the family of all full paths.
3
Abusing notation, for  2 [0; X
N
] we write g(N; ) instead of g(N)().
4
Here, for a set B  Z
~
N
, we denote by proj
N
[B] the projection of B on Z
N
.
2
Fixed-Path Rationing Method, 
(g
+
;g
 
)
: Given two paths g
+
; g
 
2 G, the
xed-path rationing method 
(g
+
;g
 
)
is dened as follows. For all N  N and
all (R;
) 2 E
N
, (i) when 
 
P
j2N
p(R
j
), there exists  2 Z such that for all
i 2 N , 
(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R;
)  minfp(R
i
); g
+
i
(N; )g, and
P
i2N
minfp(R
i
); g
+
i
(N; )g = 
;
and (ii) when 
 
P
j2N
p(R
j
), there exists  2 Z such that for all i 2 N ,

(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R;
)  maxfp(R
i
); g
 
i
(N; )g, and
P
i2N
maxfp(R
i
); g
 
i
(N; )g = 
.
5
Moulin (1999) characterized the class of xed-path rationing methods by the fol-
lowing four axioms. First, a rule only selects ecient allocations.
6
Second, no agent
can gain by misrepresenting his preference relation. Third, when some agents leave
with their allotments, then the rule allocates the remaining amount to the agents who
did not leave in the same way as before. Fourth, the amount assigned to each agent
weakly increases whenever the collective endowment increases.
7
Eciency: For all N  N and all (R;
) 2 E
N
, if 
 
P
i2N
p(R
i
), then '(R;
) 
p(R), and if 
 
P
i2N
p(R
i
), then '(R;
)  p(R).
Strategy-Proofness: For all N  N , all i 2 N , and all (R;
); (R
0
;
) 2 E
N
such
that R
Nnfig
= R
0
Nnfig
, '
i
(R;
)R
i
'
i
(R
0
;
).
Consistency: For all N
0
 N  N , all (R;
) 2 E
N
, and all i 2 N
0
,
'
i
(R
N
0
;
P
j2N
0
'
j
(R;
)) = '
i
(R;
).
Resource-Monotonicity: For all N  N and all (R;
); (R;

0
) 2 E
N
, if 
  

0
,
then '(R;
)  '(R;

0
).
Theorem 2.1 (Moulin, 1999) A rule satises eciency, strategy-proofness, con-
sistency, and resource-monotonicity if and only if it is a xed-path rationing method.
3 Proof of Suciency
Throughout let ' be a rule satisfying the properties of Theorem 2.1.
5
Note that in (i) and (ii)  is unique if
P
i2N
p(R
i
) 6= 
.
6
Sprumont (1991) pointed out that eciency is equivalent to same-sidedness. Below we use
same-sidedness in dening eciency.
7
When it is unambiguous, we sometimes use  and  to denote the vector partial ordering.
3
Lemma 3.1 ' satises peaks-onliness, i.e., for all N  N and all (R;
); (R
0
;
) 2
E
N
, if p(R) = p(R
0
), then '(R;
) = '(R
0
;
).
Proof. Let N  N , i 2 N , and (R;
); (R
0
;
) 2 E
N
be such that p(R
i
) = p(R
0
i
) and
R
Nnfig
= R
0
Nnfig
. By repeating the argument for proles that dier only in one agent's
preference, it suces to show that '(R;
) = '(R
0
;
). By eciency and strategy-
proofness, '
i
(R;
) = '
i
(R
0
;
). Thus,
P
j2Nnfig
'
j
(R;
) =
P
j2Nnfig
'
j
(R
0
;
) and
R
Nnfig
= R
0
Nnfig
. Hence, by jN j 2 f1; 2g or consistency, '(R;
) = '(R
0
;
). 
Let R
X
2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 N , p(R
X
i
) = X
i
. For all N  N and all
 2 [0; X
N
], let g
+
(N; )  '(R
X
N
; ). Let g
+
 (g
+
(N))
NN
.
Let R
0
2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 N , p(R
0
i
) = 0. For all N  N and all
 2 [0; X
N
], let g
 
(N; )  '(R
0
N
; ). Let g
 
 (g
 
(N))
NN
.
The following lemma applies to any two-agent population.
Lemma 3.2 ' is a xed-path method for f1; 2g with f1; 2g-paths g
+
(f1; 2g) and
g
 
(f1; 2g).
Proof. We only prove the lemma for the case of excess demand. The case of excess
supply is symmetric.
First, we show that g
+
(f1; 2g) is a f1; 2g-path. Feasibility follows from the deni-
tion of ', and monotonicity from resource-monotonicity of '. Thus, g
+
(f1; 2g) satis-
es (a) and (b). Finally, we show for all (R;
) 2 E
f1;2g
such that 
  p(R
1
)+ p(R
2
),
there exists  2 [0; X
f1;2g
] such that
'(R;
) = (minfp(R
1
); g
+
1
(f1; 2g; )g;minfp(R
2
); g
+
2
(f1; 2g; )g): (1)
If p(R)  '(R
X
f1;2g
;
), then by strategy-proofness, '(R;
) = '(R
X
f1;2g
;
) and (1)
holds for  = 
. Without loss of generality, suppose that p(R
1
) < '
1
(R
X
f1;2g
;
).
Then by eciency, '
1
((R
1
; R
X
2
);
)  p(R
1
). If '
1
((R
1
; R
X
2
);
) < p(R
1
), then let
R
0
1
2 R
1
be such that p(R
0
1
) = p(R
1
) and '
1
(R
X
f1;2g
;
)P
0
1
'
1
((R
1
; R
X
2
);
). Since by
peaks-onliness, '
1
((R
0
1
; R
X
2
);
) = '
1
((R
1
; R
X
2
);
), the previous relation contradicts
strategy-proofness. Thus, '
1
((R
1
; R
X
2
);
) = p(R
1
) and '
2
((R
1
; R
X
2
);
)  p(R
2
).
Hence, by strategy-proofness, '(R;
) = '((R
1
; R
X
2
);
). Monotonicity of g
+
(f1; 2g)
4
implies in the continuous model that g
+
2
(f1; 2g) is continuous with respect to .
8
Now
in the continuous model (by the previous fact, g
+
2
(f1; 2g; 0) = 0, g
+
2
(f1; 2g; X
f1;2g
) =
X
2
, and the intermediate value theorem) and in the discrete model (by monotonic-
ity of g
+
(f1; 2g)), there exists 
0
2 [0; X
f1;2g
] such that g
+
2
(f1; 2g; 
0
) = '
2
(R;
).
By monotonicity of g
+
(f1; 2g) and '
2
(R;
)  '
2
(R
X
;
), we have 
0
 
 and
g
+
1
(f1; 2g; 
0
)  g
+
1
(f1; 2g;
) > p(R
1
). Hence, (1) holds for  = 
0
. 
Lemma 3.3 g
+
is a full path.
Proof. It is easy to check that for all N  N , g
+
(N) satises (a) and (b). Let
N 
~
N  N . By consistency of ' and the denition of g
+
, proj
N
[(g
+
(
~
N))] 
(g
+
(N)). Let 
0
2 [0; X
N
]. Monotonicity of g
+
(
~
N) implies in the continuous model
that
P
i2N
g
+
i
(
~
N) is continuous with respect to . Similarly to Lemma 3.2, then
P
i2N
g
+
i
(
~
N; 0) = 0,
P
i2N
g
+
i
(
~
N;X
~
N
) = X
N
, and monotonicity of g
+
(
~
N) imply that
there exists 
00
2 [0; X
~
N
] such that
P
i2N
g
+
i
(
~
N; 
00
) = 
0
. Thus, by consistency of '
and the denition of g
+
, we have for all i 2 N g
+
i
(
~
N; 
00
) = '
i
(R
X
~
N
; 
00
) = '
i
(R
X
N
; 
0
) =
g
+
i
(N; 
0
). Thus, g
+
(N; 
0
) 2 proj
N
[(g
+
(
~
N))] and proj
N
[(g
+
(
~
N))]  (g
+
(N)).
Hence, g
+
satises (c) and g
+
is a full path. 
Similarly it can be shown that g
 
is a full path.
Lemma 3.4 ' = 
(g
+
;g
 
)
.
Proof. We only prove the lemma for the case of excess demand. Suppose that
there exist N  N and (R;
) 2 E
N
such that 
 
P
i2N
p(R
i
) and '(R;
) 6=

(g
+
;g
 
)
(R;
). Then there exist i; j 2 N such that
'
i
(R;
) < 
(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R;
) and '
j
(R;
) > 
(g
+
;g
 
)
j
(R;
): (2)
Let 

0
 '
i
(R;
) + '
j
(R;
) and 

00
 
(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R;
) + 
(g
+
;g
 
)
j
(R;
). By con-
sistency of 
(g
+
;g
 
)
, 
(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R
fi;jg
;

00
) = 
(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R;
) and 
(g
+
;g
 
)
j
(R
fi;jg
;

00
) =

(g
+
;g
 
)
j
(R;
). Thus, by Lemma 3.2,
'
i
(R
fi;jg
;

00
) = 
(g
+
;g
 
)
i
(R;
) and '
j
(R
fi;jg
;

00
) = 
(g
+
;g
 
)
j
(R;
): (3)
8
Thomson (1994b, Proof of Theorem 2, Part (i)) formally shows that if ' is ecient and resource-
monotonic, then for allN  N and all R 2 R
N
, '(R; ) is continuous with respect to 
 (and therefore
g
+
2
(f1; 2g) is continuous with respect to ).
5
By consistency of ', '
i
(R
fi;jg
;

0
) = '
i
(R;
) and '
j
(R
fi;jg
;

0
) = '
j
(R;
). Now the
previous fact combined with (2) and (3) contradicts resource-monotonicity of '. 
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